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In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice recommended team policing, which involves the decentralization of patrol 
officers and investigators to the same, defined geographical area, as a way to more 
effectively organize police officers and improve crime control.  Despite initial enthusiasm 
from police officers and administrators, team policing quickly faded from use during the 
1970s because its design was incompatible with the centralized model of policing 
prevalent at that time.  However, the implementation of community-oriented policing, 
which promotes various organizational changes and the use of problem-focused strategies, 
has changed police departments in recent years and in many ways that complement the 
use of team policing, thus allowing it a better chance to succeed.  In March 2012, the Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department implemented its own version of team policing, 
which incorporates community-oriented, problem-oriented, and hot spots policing 
strategies in an effort to reduce crime and disorder in a local neighborhood.  This study 
evaluates the impact of team policing in that neighborhood, discusses the limitations of 
the research design and data, and provides suggestions for future research on team 
policing.       
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Though the purpose of the police in America – to protect and serve the public – 
has remained unchanged throughout its history, policing strategies have transformed in 
various ways.  Police reforms have focused on improving the organizational structure and 
redefining the responsibilities of the police within the communities they serve.  Early 
reforms sought to increase police efficiency and remove potential sources of corruption 
by creating a rigid and hierarchical centralized command structure and removing 
neighborhood and political influences.  Recent reforms aim to improve policing by 
promoting physical and command decentralization, increased communication between 
officers, and community involvement in crime control and prevention. 
Originating in the late 1970s, the most recent major police reform has been the 
implementation of community-oriented policing.  Community-oriented policing is a 
multi-faceted approach which promotes organizational changes that both encourage 
community participation in crime control and prevention and incorporate problem-
solving strategies in routine police work to resolve the underlying causes of crime, 
disorder, and fear of crime (Scheider, Chapman, & Shapiro, 2009).  Community-oriented 
policing promotes policing strategies that are much different from traditional strategies.  
Whereas in a traditional centralized command the decision-making authority is reserved 
for police administrators, community-oriented policing requires that greater decision-
making authority be given to officers in order to increase their responsiveness to 
community concerns (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Scheider et al., 2009).  Also, while 




little interaction with patrol officers, community-oriented policing encourages the 
decentralization of investigators (Meese & Kurz, 1993) to allow them to work alongside 
and readily share information with patrol officers so as to more effectively reduce crime 
and quality-of-life problems (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Meese & Kurz, 1993). 
With its emphasis on community involvement, organizational restructuring, and 
problem-solving, community-oriented policing represents a dramatic departure from the 
previous, decades-old image of the American police as socially detached “crime-fighters.”  
However, the implementation of community-oriented policing was not the first attempt to 
improve policing through increased community involvement and organizational reform.  
By the early 1970s, it had become apparent that traditional policing strategies were 
unable to adequately control rising crime rates or improve deteriorating police-
community relations (Kelling and Moore, 1988); in response, police departments in 
several cities across the United States experimented with a revolutionary concept known 
as team policing. 
Team policing involves the continuous assignment of patrol officers and 
investigators to the same, defined geographical area, which allows officers to become 
familiar with area residents and problems and to use that knowledge to implement 
effective problem-solving strategies (Szynkowski, 1981; Walker, 1993).  Similar to 
community-oriented policing, team policing requires decentralized decision-making, 
which allow officers assigned to the area the authority to develop and implement crime 
reduction strategies; facilitates better information sharing between officers and 





Team policing was heralded at its inception for its potential to improve police-
community relations and more effectively control crime (Sherman, Milton, & Kelly, 
1973).  Indeed, several team policing projects did have a positive influence on police-
community relations and crime control, as well as officer morale (e.g., Bloch & Bell, 
1976; Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).  However, despite the initial enthusiasm and apparent 
successes, team policing quickly faded from use because it lacked support from the 
centralized police bureaucracy (Walker, 1993). 
With its emphasis on physical and command decentralization, team policing 
failed to become a policing standard because its design was incompatible with the 
centralized police bureaucracy of the era.  Furthermore, team police operated much like a 
special unit because traditional policing principles continued to guide the rest of the 
police department (Walker, 1993).  In contrast, community-oriented policing has had a 
dramatic and lasting impact on policing because it is a philosophy that redefines the 
police role and influences the operations of police departments as a whole.  Because 
community-oriented policing involves entire police departments and promotes many of 
the same operational changes as team policing does, it creates a supportive atmosphere in 
which the team policing approach has a better chance to succeed. 
Over the last several years, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has 
implemented various organizational changes in support of improved community-oriented 
policing, the most recent of which resulted in the development of its own version of team 
policing.  In March 2012, the Community Crimes Team, which operates in the 
Convention Center Area Command, began a focused intervention in the Palos Verdes 




numerous incidents of violent crime, property crime, and disorder in the area in recent 
years. 
The Palos Verdes project was a collaborative effort involving the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department, other local agencies and businesses, and neighborhood 
residents, which incorporated several policing strategies into the team policing approach 
including community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, and hot spots policing.  
The intervention was designed to improve police-community relations, give the residents 
a sense of pride in their community, empower them to maintain a good quality of life 
within the neighborhood, and consequently reduce the amount of crime and disorder in 
the area.  
Though the planning and development stages of several previous team policing 
projects are well-documented, few studies have assessed the effects of these projects in 
the areas where they were implemented.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to 







Modern American policing has evolved much since it began during the mid-1800s.  
The history of modern American policing can be divided into three eras: the political era, 
the reform era, and the community-oriented era.  Each of these eras can be distinguished 
from one another in terms of the organization of the police, the nature of their 
responsibilities, and their level of involvement with the community.   
The earliest era of modern American policing was the political era, which lasted 
from the 1840s to the 1920s.  By this time in their history, police departments had 
developed into quasi-military organizations with a centralized command; however, due to 
the technological limitations of the time, police operations were considerably 
decentralized (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  Before the widespread use of automobiles, 
officers patrolled their assigned beats on foot, which allowed them to become well-
acquainted with residents in the area and knowledgeable about their problems and 
concerns.  Because officers did not yet have radios to keep them in constant contact with 
the centralized command, they had much discretion in handling the problems they 
encountered on their beats. 
Though crime control was always a priority, the police had many additional 
responsibilities during the political era.  Officers addressed both social and physical 
disorder concerns such as public intoxication and vandalism and provided various social 
services to the community such as obtaining meals and housing for the homeless (Moore 
& Kelling, 1983), and helping newly-arrived immigrants to find work (Kelling & Moore, 




police activities and much police work revolved around addressing what they considered 
to be major concerns.  Policing during the political era did have its strengths in that 
officers provided many useful services to residents beyond mere law enforcement and 
also became very familiar with all aspects of the communities they patrolled (Kelling & 
Moore, 1988).  However, due to the decentralization and limited supervision in early 
police departments, officers were also highly inefficient with regard to crime control and 
easily corrupted by neighborhood influences (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
The next era of modern policing, the reform era, began during the early 1930s in 
response to the corruption and inefficiency that plagued the police during the political era 
and also defined the image of police officers until the 1970s.  Considering neighborhood 
influences along with a weak command structure to be the major sources of police 
corruption and inefficiency, police reformers including August Vollmer and O. W. 
Wilson led efforts to change policing in various ways (Kelling & Bratton, 1993). 
One of the hallmarks of reform era policing was the strengthening of centralized 
command and control.  Political leaders no longer had control over the police; instead, 
middle managers, such as captains and lieutenants, were responsible for directing police 
activities.  Middle managers also held much of the decision-making authority in the 
organization while officer discretion became greatly restricted (Kelling, 1994; Kelling & 
Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Moore, 1988).  Also, while officers formerly conducted a wide 
range of activities within their assigned neighborhoods, reforms separated investigations 
from patrol activities so specialization, rather than geography, determined officer 




Along with the organizational restructuring, the nature of police work also 
transformed.  Police officers now focused primarily on law enforcement and making 
arrests while their social service duties became the responsibility of social workers 
(Moore & Kelling, 1983).  Officers utilized new crime control tactics, such as preventive 
patrol and rapid response to calls for service in their new role as “crime-fighters.”  Patrol 
cars replaced foot patrol because they enabled officers to respond to calls for service 
more quickly and over a greater geographical area.  However, despite this increased 
efficiency, the use of patrol cars also contributed to the alienation of officers from the 
communities they patrolled (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
Police reforms also redefined the role of the community in policing.  Instead of 
approaching a patrol officer, residents now called a central dispatcher to notify the police 
about neighborhood problems.  Crime control was considered the sole responsibility of 
the police and residents were expected to not interfere (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
Centralizing officers and redefining their interactions with residents did aid in alleviating 
corruption, but had the unintended consequence of straining police-community relations. 
The current era of modern policing, the community-oriented era, emerged during 
the late 1970s as a way to “reconnect police to citizens and encourage innovative, 
proactive, collaborative, and strategic approaches to crime prevention” (Scheider et al., 
2009, p. 695).  Not only had the use of motorized patrol and organizational reform 
contributed to strained police-community relations, policing research concluded that 
conventional policing strategies, such as preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for 
service, and follow-up investigations did not significantly reduce crime (Braga, Flynn, 




instituted various organizational changes and again redefined both the nature of police 
responsibilities and the role of the community in policing. 
The effectiveness of community-oriented policing depends, in part, on the police 
being informed about problems in the community and using that knowledge to develop 
policies that will resolve those problems; however, the traditional centralized command 
structure hinders that effectiveness.  Because decision-making in a centralized command 
is the responsibility of police administrators who are in the higher levels of the chain of 
command and who have little interaction with the communities their policies affect, the 
police are disadvantaged in their ability to identify and resolve community problems 
(Angell, 1971; Walker, 1993).  In contrast, community-oriented policing supports 
decentralized decision-making to allow officers who work in the community to have 
more responsibility in planning and implementing responses to community problems 
(Scheider et al., 2009). 
Community-oriented policing also supports the physical decentralization of 
investigators as a way to utilize their knowledge and skills more effectively in crime 
control and prevention.  During the reform era, when investigations became highly 
specialized and separate from patrol activities, investigators operated out of centralized 
bureaus where case records were located.  However, given that advances in information-
sharing technology now allow instant access to records across jurisdictions, investigator 
centralization is no longer necessary (Meese & Kurz, 1993).  In addition, though 
investigators acquire considerable knowledge through their work about crime patterns 
and their underlying causes, centralized investigations have traditionally focused on 




enables investigators to readily share that knowledge with patrol officers and collaborate 
with them in order to develop better crime control and prevention strategies (Braga et al., 
2010). 
While crime control was the major emphasis of policing during the reform era, 
community-oriented policing focuses on addressing the underlying problems that cause 
crime, disorder, and fear of crime in communities.  Community-oriented policing 
encourages the formation of partnerships between the police and community in order to 
identify problems and develop problem-solving strategies to control and prevent crime 
(Scheider et al., 2009).  Rather than relying solely on official police responses like arrest 
to reduce crime, community-oriented policing encourages the use of a variety of 
alternative interventions when developing these problem-solving strategies (Scheider et 
al., 2009). 
Problem-Oriented Policing 
As a consequence of the widespread corruption and inefficiency in policing 
during the political era, the dominant reform philosophy through the 1960s was that 
policing could be most dramatically improved through organizational reform (Goldstein, 
1979; Kelling & Bratton, 1993).  However, Goldstein (1979) argued that continuing to 
focus solely on police management reform ignores the true purpose of policing, which is 
to resolve the variety of problems that cause crime, disorder, and fear of crime within 
communities.   
In developing the problem-oriented policing approach, Goldstein emphasized that 
police should be more methodical in how they address problems.  Eck and Spelman 




recommendation and provides the framework that has been used to develop numerous 
problem-oriented policing interventions.  Following the SARA model, officers scan for 
problems in an area, analyze the nature of those problems, develop a response, and 
analyze whether the chosen response has had the desired impact (Eck & Spelman, 1987). 
Problem-oriented policing interventions address the underlying problems that 
cause crime and disorder in communities by removing the opportunities and incentives 
for those incidents to occur.  While many problem-oriented policing evaluations have 
reported significant decreases in crime and disorder in intervention areas, one major 
criticism of these studies is that they often neglect to consider the possibility that these 
problems have been relocated rather than reduced (Eck, 1993).  However, because the 
opportunities for crime and disorder to occur are not evenly distributed and vary in terms 
of the risks and rewards they present to potential offenders, complete crime displacement 
rarely occurs.  Moreover, when displacement does occur, it is usually not extensive 
enough to completely negate the beneficial effects of a successful crime control 
intervention (Eck, 1993; Weisburd et al., 2006).               
An alternative to crime displacement involves the diffusion of crime control 
benefits.  In other words, this diffusion occurs when catchment areas near the 
intervention area experience decreases in crime and disorder without being directly 
exposed to the intervention strategies (Eck, 1993; Weisburd et al., 2006).  Assuming that 
the same offenders are responsible for crime and disorder in the intervention and 
catchment areas, one explanation for the diffusion of crime control benefits suggests that 
the apprehension and subsequent incapacitation of these offenders causes crime and 




majority of offenders are only incapacitated for short periods, a more likely explanation is 
that potential offenders are deterred in catchment areas because they incorrectly assume 
that the geographical boundaries of the police interventions extend much farther than the 
intervention area (Braga et al, 1999; Weisburd et al, 2006).        
Hot Spots Policing 
 Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) conducted a study to determine the 
distribution of calls for police service in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Their study 
determined that calls for service were not evenly distributed across the city, but instead 
clustered at certain locations, also referred to as “hot spots.”  In Minneapolis, 50.4 
percent of all calls for service recorded over a one-year period originated at just 3.3 
percent of all the addresses in the city.  However, Sherman et al. also found that the 
majority of the calls for service at these locations were for minor incidents (e.g., traffic 
accidents and noise complaints).  Importantly, this indicates that though police may be 
dispatched repeatedly to certain addresses, these hot spots are not necessarily more 
dangerous than other locations where calls for service originate less frequently. 
The identification of hot spots is particularly important for the police when using 
problem-oriented policing strategies because it allows them to focus their resources on 
the locations where disproportionately high amounts of crime and disorder occur (Taylor, 
Koper, & Woods, 2011; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).  Several studies have examined the 
effectiveness of problem-oriented policing at reducing crime in hot spots.  Comparing the 
effectiveness of saturation patrol to that of problem-oriented policing in violent hot spots 
in Jacksonville, Florida, Taylor et al. (2011) found that the use of problem-oriented 




period following the police intervention.  In a study of violent crime hot spots in Jersey 
City, New Jersey, Braga et al. (1999) found that street fight, property crime, and narcotics 
calls for service, as well as robbery and property crime incidents, all decreased 
significantly in areas that received problem-oriented interventions.  Braga and Bond 
(2008) studied problem-oriented policing interventions at 17 hot spots in Lowell, 
Massachusetts that combined various policing strategies such as situational crime 
prevention, social service referrals, and order maintenance.  Braga and Bond found that 
the use of problem-oriented interventions was associated with a 40 percent decrease in 
robbery calls for service, a 34 percent decrease in assault calls for service, and a 36 
percent decrease in burglary calls for service; they also found that situational crime 
prevention measures had the most influence on crime reduction.              
Team Policing 
 In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice recommended team policing as an alternative to the traditional model of policing, 
which involves investigators and patrol officers working in separate locations, having 
little contact with one another, and following different chains of command.  Instead, the 
President’s Commission suggested that officers be generalists capable of delivering both 
investigative and patrol services within the same defined area and follow a single chain of 
command (Winslow, 1969).  According to the President’s Commission, team policing 
would lead to “increased crime solution and the most advantageous use of the time and 
talents of all policemen” (Winslow, 1969, p. 268).  Recognizing that tensions had been 




police administrators also considered team policing a viable way to improve police-
community relations (Walker, 1993). 
The underlying principle of team policing is that close community interaction is 
an essential element of successful crime control (Vastola, 1977).  Continuous assignment 
to a defined geographical area keeps officers in regular contact with community residents 
and aids officers in both identifying problems in the area and collecting information that 
can lead to improved crime control (Syznkowski, 1981).  Additionally, the decentralized 
decision-making that is an integral part of team policing allows officers assigned to the 
area the authority to develop and implement individualized solutions to neighborhood 
problems and thereby makes officers more responsive to community concerns (Walker, 
1993). 
 By the mid-1970s, approximately 60 police departments around the United States 
had experimented with their own versions of team policing (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).  
Much of the existing team policing evaluation literature is limited to descriptions of the 
planning and development phases of these projects and provides little discussion, if any, 
regarding the impact of team policing on crime and other problems (e.g., Kerstetter, 
1981; Myren, 1972; Sherman, et al., 1973).  The few cities whose team policing projects’ 
impact has been discussed in greater detail include Cincinnati (Ohio), Detroit (Michigan), 
and Rochester (New York).  
Cincinnati, Ohio 
The Cincinnati Police Division’s (CPD) Community Sector Team Policing 
(COMSEC) project lasted from March 1973 until September 1975 and was designed to 




second attempt at team policing after a 1971 attempt failed due to implementation 
problems.  COMSEC was implemented in a 3.7 square mile area known as District 1.  
This area had a residential population of 35,000 though with the influx of workers, 
shoppers, and tourists during the week, the daily population was often closer to 250,000.  
District 1 was divided into six sectors; a team was assigned to each sector and one 
lieutenant and three sergeants supervised each team.  COMSEC officers were given the 
authority to plan and coordinate all police activities in their assigned areas and were 
encouraged to act as generalists, meaning that they would be responsible for both patrol 
and investigative duties (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977). 
Though COMSEC initially operated as it was designed, administrative decisions 
greatly affected the program after the first 18 months.  The teams became less 
autonomous and decentralized; the centralized command increased its control over police 
activities in District 1 and specialized investigators, rather than team officers, were 
assigned to handle most of the investigations in the area.  While officers were initially 
enthusiastic about COMSEC, the police administrators’ lack of commitment to the 
original model affected the officers’ morale (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977). 
Despite the administrative changes that led to the eventual demise of COMSEC, 
an evaluation of the project did find that the program had been successful in many ways.  
Survey results indicated that team policing had a positive impact on police-community 
relations and officer attitudes.  Regarding crime in the city, team policing had the greatest 
impact on burglary; according to UCR data, District 1 had greater decreases in burglaries 
than the rest of the city during the first 18 months of COMSEC.  Further, local businesses 




robberies during the same 18 months.  However, after the operational changes in 
COMSEC took effect, burglaries in the city increased to just below their pre-COMSEC 
levels and victimization survey reports of commercial burglaries and robberies matched 
their pre-COMSEC levels (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977). 
Detroit, Michigan 
 In April 1970, the Detroit Police Department implemented the Beat Commander 
project in a small, predominately black neighborhood located in the Tenth Precinct, an 
area that had been experiencing a dramatic increase in crime over the previous four years 
and accounted for 18 percent of the serious crime in the precinct.  Through decentralized 
decision-making and the focused delivery of police services in a small area, the Beat 
Commander project was designed to improve police-community relations and reduce 
crime (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972). 
The Beat Commander team began with two supervising sergeants – one who 
acted as the beat commander and another who acted as the assistant beat commander; 
eighteen black patrolmen and six white patrolmen; and three investigators, though 
staffing levels did fluctuate over the course of the project.  As beat commanders who 
were accountable for all police operations in the project area, the sergeants had many 
more responsibilities than regular sergeants; for example, they were required to use data 
analysis to manage patrol activities, handle community complaints, supervise officers at 
work in the project area, and report to the precinct commander about the Beat 
Commander project (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972).   
Patrol activities were also different in the project area.  In addition to their regular 




cars were still used during each of the three daily shifts, several officers were assigned to 
patrol the neighborhood on foot or by scooter during times of increased criminal activity.  
While the team officers were supposed to remain in the project area during their shifts, 
central dispatchers often ignored this requirement and assigned Beat Command patrol 
cars to calls elsewhere in the precinct.  The investigators particularly enjoyed being 
assigned exclusively to the Beat Commander project area because it enabled them “to 
develop information sources more successfully and to recognize crime patterns more 
clearly” (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 59). 
The Beat Commander project ended in 1971 and though it appeared to have a 
positive influence on police-community relations and officer morale, proper evaluation 
conditions were never established so the impact of the program on crime is unclear.  The 
number of reported crimes in the area increased from 16 to 23 percent of the total reports 
in the precinct during the intervention period, but it was never determined whether the 
increase in reports was due to an actual increase in crime or the result of residents’ 
increased willingness to bring crime problems to the attention of the officers (Bloch & 
Ulberg, 1972). 
Rochester, New York 
 In response to increasing crime rates, the Rochester Police Department began a 
team policing project known as Coordinated Team Patrol (CTP) in 1971 as a way to 
improve its crime clearance rates and the quality of its investigations.  The department 
created two teams that were permanently assigned to deliver all police services within 
separate, defined areas of the city.  Each team was comprised of about 30 patrol officers 




eventually selected for the team policing interventions – patrol areas A and C – were 
similar to one another in multiple respects; each area covered approximately one-third of 
the city and had a significant proportion of minority, juvenile, and impoverished residents 
as compared to the rest of the city (Bloch & Bell, 1976). 
An evaluation of the impact of CTP occurred between July and November 1973.  
In terms of arrests, the evaluation found that the team police were more likely to make an 
arrest during a burglary, larceny, or robbery investigation than the non-team officers in 
patrol area B.  Similarly, team police cleared more burglary, larceny, and robbery cases 
than non-team officers did.  Both team and non-team officers had a positive opinion of 
the project, noting that team policing facilitated better communication between patrol 
officers and investigators, and allowed them address crime problems more effectively 
(Bloch & Bell, 1976). 
While the evaluation did not find that the overall crime rate decreased more in 
Rochester after the implementation of CTP as compared to other similarly sized cities, it 
did find a difference in crime rates between the team and non-team areas.  Before the 
CTP project began, both burglary and robbery rates were higher in the team areas than 
the non-team area, though the non-team area did have a higher larceny rate.  Afterward, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny rates all increased (and remained higher) in the non-team 
area while those rates all decreased in the team areas (Bloch & Bell, 1976). 
The Decline of Team Policing 
Despite the successes of team policing projects and the enthusiasm of the officers 
involved in them, team policing encountered much opposition from within the police 




who often did not want to relinquish their control over police activities, opposed 
command decentralization and prevented the proper implementation of team policing 
projects (Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Sherman, 1975).  Other officers in the department, 
who were often not well-informed about the nature of team policing or what it sought to 
accomplish, were also unsupportive of the projects and resented the team officers’ 
successes (Walker, 1993).  Centralized dispatching technology was also problematic 
because team officers were frequently dispatched to calls outside of their assigned areas, 
which limited the time officers could spend resolving neighborhood problems (Walker, 
1993). 
Team Policing in the Community-Oriented Era 
Team policing failed to become an enduring police strategy when it was first 
implemented because it was incompatible with the rigid, centralized model of policing 
prevalent at the time.  However, through its support of physical and command 
decentralization, increased community involvement in crime control and prevention, and 
problem-focused policing strategies, community-oriented policing has changed police 
departments in many ways that complement the use of team policing.   
With the development of new policing strategies in recent decades, police have 
become more innovative in their use of interventions to address community problems.  
This study evaluates the impact of a team policing intervention that incorporated the 
community-oriented, problem-oriented, and hot spots policing strategies in an effort to 








The Palos Verdes Project 
Formerly located in the Lincoln 1 sector/beat of the Convention Center Area 
Command1, the Palos Verdes neighborhood is a predominately Spanish-speaking 
Hispanic/Latino, lower-income area where the majority of residents live in rented 
housing.  In recent years, as property owners and managers had neglected basic building 
maintenance, drug houses had been established, and gang activity had increased, the 
quality of life in the neighborhood had diminished and the area had become a hot spot for 
violent crime, property crime, and disorder.  The neighborhood has also had a history of 
severely strained police-community relations, which stems from a 1996 incident in which 
two off-duty officers shot and killed a neighborhood resident without justification 
(Benjamin, 1997).  According to Convention Center Area Command officers, mistrust of 
the police caused many incidents in the neighborhood to go unreported in the years since 
the shooting and residents often refused to cooperate with investigations.  This mistrust 
also limited the officers’ ability to improve neighborhood conditions and address the 
underlying problems in the area that have led to crime and disorder.   
In an effort to finally resolve the ongoing problems in the neighborhood, the 
Convention Center Area Command initiated the Palos Verdes team policing project on 
March 27, 2012.  The goals of the project were to not only reduce crime and disorder 
incidents and restore the residents’ confidence in the police, but to instill in the residents 
a sense of pride in their community, to encourage them to be responsible for 
                                                        
1 Due to the reorganization of the Convention Center Area Command in February 2013, the Palos Verdes 
neighborhood is now located in the Nora 2 sector/beat of the South Central Area Command. 
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During the initial months of the intervention, the team met weekly to discuss the 
status of the various problems in the Palos Verdes neighborhood and to plan police and 
community activities designed to address those problems.  The team also participated in 
regular community meetings, which encouraged communication between the residents 
and officers about problems in the neighborhood and the progress of the intervention. 
Intervention 
Proactive policing strategies such as saturation patrol and investigations were 
used primarily when the team policing intervention first began as a way to remove the 
most problematic individuals (i.e., known gang members and drug offenders) from the 
area.  The majority of this work was completed during the team’s first few weeks in the 
neighborhood so the remainder of the intervention became largely a community effort 
with minimal need for law enforcement activities.  Several intervention activities were 
aimed at improving the quality of life in the neighborhood.  Between April and August 
2012, the Community Crimes Team organized four Combined Multi-Agency Response 
Team (CMART) inspections.  These inspections involved several agencies including the 
Clark County Health District, Clark County Code Enforcement, the Fire Prevention 
Division, NV Energy, Public Works, and social service agencies and were conducted in 
order to get property owners and managers to make necessary improvements to their 
buildings and to improve the quality of the residents’ living conditions.  In addition, the 
team also organized trash and graffiti cleanup events in April and July 2012 in which 
























Other intervention activities focused on community outreach.  In addition to 
regularly patrolling the neighborhood and making contacts with residents, the 
Community Crimes Team organized several community events.  In May 2012, 
approximately 200 people attended the Palos Verdes Pride event, which was organized in 
partnership with other agencies and local businesses that donated various items and 
services, and was held in order to bring the residents together and promote community 
cohesion.  Other major community events included National Night Out in August 2012, 
which focused on promoting neighborhood crime prevention, and “Trunk or Treat” in 
October 2012, at which officers handed out candy and provided the neighborhood 
children with various other Halloween-themed activities.  In addition to organizing these 
events, the Community Crimes Team also partnered with social service and faith-based 
organizations to provide services aimed at improving the well-being of the residents.      
  





Figure 2 shows an approximate timeline of the major activities that occurred between 
April and December 2012.  Through these various activities and community partnerships, 
the team policing intervention was designed to help the residents build the strong sense of 
community that had long been nonexistent in the area and in so doing, enable them to 





The results from the evaluations of the team policing projects in Cincinnati (Ohio), 
Detroit (Michigan), and Rochester (New York) suggest not only that team policing may 
have a greater impact on crime than traditional policing does, but also that team policing 
may have a greater impact on certain types of crime.  Therefore, this study will evaluate 
the following eight hypotheses:  
H1: Team policing will have an impact on violent calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period. 
 
H2: Team policing will have an impact on property calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period. 
 
H3: Team policing will have an impact on disorder calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period. 
 
H4: Team policing will have an impact on total calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period. 
 
H5: Team policing will have an impact on violent calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011. 
 
H6: Team policing will have an impact on property calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011. 
 
H7: Team policing will have an impact on disorder calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011.  
 
H8: Team policing will have an impact on total calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011. 
 
Data 
This study uses calls for service data to evaluate the impact of team policing in 
the Palos Verdes neighborhood.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
provided calls for service data from April 2011 through December 2012 and classified 




which each include specific offenses.  Appendix A provides a listing of the various 
offenses considered in the analyses by category along with their corresponding Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department dispatch codes.  In all, calls for 21 violent offenses, five 
property offenses, and 21 disorder offenses were considered in the analyses. 
Previous studies have used calls for service as a measure of crime and disorder 
(e.g., Klinger & Bridges, 1997; Sherman, et al., 1989; Warner & Pierce, 1993) though 
these studies do note that calls for service data do have some limitations that can affect 
their accuracy as such a measure.  First, residents may report incidents inaccurately to the 
police dispatcher.  For example, when a resident reports a robbery, the responding officer 
may either determine that a crime did not occur or reclassify the robbery as a different 
offense (e.g., a burglary).  Second, one incident may be reported multiple times and thus 
be counted as separate incidents.  Third, calls for service data do not include those 
incidents that residents do not report to the police or, alternately, those incidents that 
residents report to a patrol officer rather than to a police dispatcher.   
Considering that one of the goals of the team policing intervention is to restore the 
residents’ confidence in the police so that they will notify the police when crime and 
disorder incidents occur, calls for service data are still appropriate for use in this study.  
However, due to their limitations and because calls for service primarily indicate how 
often residents contact the police for assistance (Warner & Pierce, 1993), it is with 
caution that these data are used to describe changes in the amount of crime and disorder 







Because random assignment was not feasible, this study utilizes a quasi-
experimental, non-equivalent control groups design.  To determine the impact of team 
policing, the analyses involve comparing the number of calls for service before and after 
the implementation of team policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood as well as 
comparing the number of calls for service in three control areas during the same periods.  
The analyses also compare the calls for service data in a catchment area adjacent to the 
Palos Verdes neighborhood to assess whether the team policing intervention has 
displaced crime or, alternately, whether a diffusion of crime control benefits from the 
team policing intervention has occurred nearby. 
 
Figure 3. Palos Verdes Neighborhood and Catchment Area 
 
 
The Palos Verdes neighborhood and the catchment area, which were formerly 
located in the Lincoln 1 sector/beat of the Convention Center Area Command, are shown 
 





in Figure 3.  Similar to the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the catchment area is a small, 
rented housing area that, according to Convention Center Area Command officers, has 
also been the location of numerous crime and disorder incidents in recent years.  Due to 
these characteristics and its proximity to the Palos Verdes neighborhood, it may provide 
similar opportunities for crime and disorder to occur that could potentially be exploited 
by offenders displaced by the team policing intervention. 
The three control areas were chosen in consultation with the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department and are similar to the Palos Verdes neighborhood in 
terms of their size, demographics, and numbers of calls for service in 2011.  Appendices 
B, C, and D provide further geographical information about the five comparison areas; 
specifically, Appendix B shows the geographical boundaries of each control area, 
Appendix C includes a map of the city of Las Vegas, Nevada which shows the locations 
of all five comparison areas relative to one another, and Appendix D includes a map of 
the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Area Command jurisdictions which 





Calls for Service in the Comparison Areas, April 1, 2011-December 31, 2011  
Area Violent Property Disorder Total   
Palos Verdes 6 8 87 101  
Catchment Area 11 6 108 125  
Control Area 1 37 12 101 150  
Control Area 2 4 15 69 88  







Prior to the team policing intervention, these five areas had comparable numbers 
of calls for service.  Table 1 shows the numbers of calls for service by offense category in 
each comparison area between April 1, 2011 and December 31, 2011.  Similar to the 
Palos Verdes neighborhood, the control areas are lower-income areas with high 
percentages of Hispanic/Latino residents and rented housing as compared to the city of 
Las Vegas.  Table 2 provides specific demographic data for the Palos Verdes 
neighborhood and catchment area, the three control areas, and the city of Las Vegas. 
This study focuses on the first nine complete months of the intervention (April 
2012 to December 2012).  To assess the immediate impact of team policing in the 
neighborhood, calls for service during this nine-month intervention period were 
compared to calls for service during the nine-month period immediately before the 
intervention (July 2011 to March 2012).  To control for seasonal effect, calls for service 
during the intervention period were also compared to calls for service during the same 






Demographics of the Comparison Areas 
Variable Palos Verdes / Catchment  Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Las Vegas 
Sex (%)      
Male 58.7 50.8 54.3 51.8 50.3 
Female 41.3 49.2 45.7 48.2 49.7 
Age in years (%)a      
0-19 23.6 31.3 24.5 48.1 28.0 
20-34 29.9 22.3 26.0 25.1 22.0 
35-44 13.7 14.4 11.4 7.7 14.9 
45-54 14.6 9.8 15.2 14.5 13.6 
55 and over 18.4 22.2 22.9 4.5 21.5 
Race, non-Hispanic/Latino (%)     
White 35.3 40.0 30.9 12.8 47.5 
Black 3.2 10.4 14.3 22.1 10.4 
Other 5.5 5.7 6.4 1.2 12.1 
Hispanic/Latino (%) 56.0 43.9 48.4 63.9 30.0 
Mean income ($) 35,466 52,153 39,936 26,865 70,135 
Poverty (%) 15.8 19.6 27.5 41.8 13.5 
Rented housing (%) 94.1 57.5 69.2 100.0 44.6 
Residency ≤ 5 years (%) 73.4 57.8 65.3 89.4 55.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) 







ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
The first part of the analyses involved a visual examination of the calls for service 
trends in each area and the second part involved the use of t-tests to determine whether 
the differences in mean calls for service per week in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the 
three control areas, and the catchment area were statistically significant.  An independent 
samples t-test was used to compare the mean calls for service per week during the nine-
month intervention period (April 2012 to December 2012) with the nine-month period 
immediately prior to the intervention (July 2011 to March 2012).  A paired samples t-test 
was used to compare the mean calls for service per week during the intervention period 
with the same nine-month period in the previous year (April 2011 to December 2012).  
The paired samples t-test was selected over the independent samples t-test in that case 
because the analysis involves comparing the mean calls for service per week in the same 
period, but under two different conditions. 
To calculate the mean calls for service per week during the three time periods, the 
data were first divided into weeks and the numbers of violent, property, disorder, and 
total calls for service were recorded for each week.  Then, the numbers of calls for 
service were divided by the total number of weeks in each period.  Because the data were 
divided so that each week began on Sunday and ended on Saturday, one week in each 
time period contained less than seven days; therefore, the data from those weeks were 
excluded from the statistical analyses.  As a result, each period in the statistical analyses 




Figures 8-17 in Appendix E show the trends in total calls for service across the 
five comparison areas.  Specifically, Figures 8-12 show the calls for service trends across 
the pre-intervention and intervention periods and Figures 13-17 show quarterly 
comparisons of the calls for service trends during the intervention period with the same 
months in 2011.  Comparing the intervention period to the prior nine-month period, 
Figure 8 indicates that the pattern of calls for service changed in the Palos Verdes 
neighborhood, with notable spikes occurring during the first ten weeks of the intervention.  
Figure 9 indicates that the pattern of calls for service in the catchment area generally 
remained consistent.  Figures 10 and 11 similarly indicate relatively little change in the 
pattern of calls for service in Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively.  In contrast, Figure 12 
shows a noticeable decrease in weekly calls for service in Control Area 3, particularly 
after the tenth week of the intervention period.  Comparing the intervention period to the 
same period in 2011, Figure 13 shows a similar pattern of calls for service in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood during the first 10 weeks, which may indicate that the notable calls 
for service spikes were the result of a seasonal influence on calls for service rather than 
the police intervention.  Figures 14, 15, and 16 all show relatively few pattern differences 
in the catchment area and Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively.  However, Figure 17 again 
shows considerable decreases in weekly calls for service in Control Area 3, particularly 
during the second, third, and fourth quarters.       
The results of the t-tests lend support to visual trends observed in the comparison 
areas.  The results of the independent samples t-tests comparing the nine-month period 




in Table 3 and the results of the paired samples t-tests comparing the nine-month 




Changes in Calls for Service, Pre-Intervention: Intervention 
Area July 2011-March 2012 April-December 2012 N Change (%) t N M (SD) N M (SD) 
Palos Verdes         
Violent 8 .21 (.41) 18 .46 (.68) 125.00 2.013* 
Property 9 .23 (.43) 18 .46 (.82) 100.00 1.556 
Disorder 82 2.10 (1.41) 94 2.41 (1.65) 14.63 .885 
Total 99 2.54 (1.52) 130 3.33 (1.92) 31.31 2.025* 
         
Catchment Area         
Violent 10 .26 (.50) 15 .38 (.67) 50.00 .956 
Property 5 .13 (.34) 14 .36 (.78) 180.00 1.699 
Disorder 103 2.64 (1.91) 92 2.36 (1.76) -10.68 -.679 
Total 118 3.03 (1.98) 121 3.10 (2.26) 2.54 .160 
         
Control Area 1         
Violent 31 .79 (1.06) 25 .64 (.90) -19.35 -.692 
Property 12 .31 (.52) 5 .13 (.34) -58.33 -1.804 
Disorder 80 2.05 (1.76) 114 2.92 (1.93) 42.50 2.087* 
Total 123 3.15 (2.28) 144 3.69 (2.38) 17.07 1.022 
         
Control Area 2         
Violent 7 .18 (.39) 10 .26 (.55) 42.86 .714 
Property 10 .26 (.55) 25 .64 (.96) 150.00 2.173* 
Disorder 62 1.59 (1.23) 63 1.62 (1.41) 1.61 .086 
Total 88 2.03 (1.29) 97 2.49 (1.81) 22.78 1.300 
         
Control Area 3         
Violent 13 .33 (.66) 11 .28 (.65) -15.38 -.346 
Property 16 .41 (.50) 4 .10 (.38) -75.00 -3.056** 
Disorder 155 3.97 (2.25) 75 1.92 (1.46) -51.61 -4.773** 
Total 184 4.72 (2.74) 90 2.31 (1.59) -51.09 -4.746** 











Changes in Calls for Service, Previous Year: Intervention 
Area April-December 2011 April-December 2012 N Change (%) t N M (SD) N M (SD) 
Palos Verdes         
Violent 6 .15 (.37) 18 .46 (.68) 200.00 2.508* 
Property 8 .21 (.47) 18 .46 (.82) 125.00 1.885 
Disorder 86 2.21 (1.79) 94 2.41 (1.65) 9.30 .572 
Total 100 2.56 (1.98) 130 3.33 (1.92) 30.00 2.059* 
         
Catchment Area        
Violent 11 .28 (.51) 15 .38 (.67) 36.36 1.000 
Property 6 .15 (.37) 14 .36 (.78) 133.33 1.388 
Disorder 107 2.74 (2.12) 92 2.36 (1.76) -14.02 -1.029 
Total 124 3.18 (2.13) 121 3.10 (2.26) -2.42 -.175 
         
Control Area 1         
Violent 37 .95 (1.05) 25 .64 (.90) -32.43 -1.356 
Property 12 .31 (.52) 5 .13 (.34) -58.33 -1.741 
Disorder 101 2.59 (1.74) 114 2.92 (1.93) 12.87 .750 
Total 150 3.85 (2.20) 144 3.69 (2.38) -4.00 -.289 
         
Control Area 2         
Violent 4 .10 (.31) 10 .26 (.55) 150.00 1.433 
Property 15 .38 (.63) 25 .64 (.96) 66.67 1.433 
Disorder 68 1.74 (1.39) 63 1.62 (1.41) -7.35 -.397 
Total 88 2.26 (1.55) 97 2.49 (1.81) 10.23 .600 
         
Control Area 3         
Violent 18 .46 (.76) 11 .28 (.65) -38.89 -1.045 
Property 14 .36 (.49) 4 .10 (.38) -71.43 -2.693** 
Disorder 186 4.77 (2.21) 75 1.92 (1.46) -59.68 -6.273** 
Total 218 5.59 (2.51) 90 2.31 (1.59) -58.72 -6.482** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the mean calls for service per week increased in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood during the intervention period in all calls for service categories as 
compared to the prior nine-month period, though only the mean violent and mean total 
calls for service increased significantly.  However, the catchment area adjacent to the 




service categories.  Control Area 1 only experienced a significant increase in mean 
disorder calls for service per week while Control Area 2 only experienced a significant 
increase in mean property calls for service per week.  Finally, Control Area 3 experienced 
a decrease in all calls for service categories with significant decreases in mean property, 
mean disorder, and mean total calls for service per week. 
As shown in Table 4, the mean calls for service in the Palos Verdes neighborhood 
increased in all categories during the intervention period as compared to the same period 
in 2011 and again, both the mean violent and mean total calls for service increased 
significantly.  As with the pre-intervention comparison, the catchment area adjacent to 
the Palos Verdes neighborhood did not experience significant changes in any of the calls 
for service categories.  Neither Control Area 1 nor Control Area 2 had any significant 
changes in the mean calls for service per week as compared to the same period in 2011.  
Similar to the pre-intervention comparison, Control Area 3 experienced decreases in all 
calls for service categories with significant decreases in mean property, mean disorder, 
and mean total calls for service per week. 
Despite significant increases in mean disorder and mean property calls per week 
during the intervention period in Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively, there were no 
significant differences in either of these areas in any of the calls for service categories as 
compared to the same period in 2011.  Therefore, a seasonal effect could be responsible 
for the significant differences in mean calls for service between the pre-intervention and 
intervention periods in those areas.  In other words, it is possible that the numbers of 
disorder and property calls for service are typically lower in Control Areas 1 and 2, 




Though Figure 13 suggests that a seasonal effect may be responsible for some of 
the observed calls for service spikes in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, considering that 
both the mean violent and mean total calls for service increased significantly during the 
intervention period as compared to both the pre-intervention period and the same period 
in 2011, it is less likely that a seasonal effect is responsible for these increases.  Therefore, 
it is plausible that the team policing intervention was responsible for the observed 
differences in calls for service per week in the Palos Verdes neighborhood.  In support of 
this, Figure 4 shows the number of calls for service per week along with the timeline of 
major events during the intervention period in the Palos Verdes neighborhood. 
  




Week  Week  Week  
3 CMART 1 17 Cleanup 2 21 CMART 4 
4 Cleanup 1 18 Community meeting 1 30 Community meeting 2 
7 
 
PV Pride event 
& CMART 2 19 National Night Out 
31 
 









Though it cannot be determined for certain with the current data whether the 





























several calls for service spikes occurred during or around the weeks of major team 
activities.  For example, notable spikes occurred just after the start of the team policing 
intervention as well as during and just after the weeks of the Palos Verdes Community 
Pride event and the second CMART (week 7). 
The results of the t-tests indicate that the team policing intervention was 
associated with significant increases in mean violent and mean total calls for service in 
the Palos Verdes neighborhood during the intervention period as compared to both the 
pre-intervention period and the same period in 2011.  Therefore, the results lend support 
to hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 8.  Because the team policing intervention was not associated 
with significant changes in mean disorder and property calls for service, the results do not 
support hypotheses 2, 3, 6, and 7. 
     
Table 5 
Changes in Violent Calls for Service in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood 
  Previous Year Pre-Intervention Intervention 
Code Offense 




March 31,  
2012 














413 Person with a gun 0 0 1 
413A Person with a knife 1 2 1 
415 Assault/battery 4 5 5 
415B Assault/battery with 
other deadly weapon 
0 0 3 
415D Assault/battery 
(domestic violence) 
0 0 7 




The t-test results also suggest that the team policing intervention had a greater 
impact on violent calls for service than on property and disorder calls for service.  As 
shown in Table 5, calls for service for assault and battery offenses (i.e., 415, 415B, and 
415D) increased the most during the intervention period as compared to both the pre-
intervention period and the same period in 2011.  However, given the overall low 
numbers of violent calls for service, it cannot be determined for certain whether the team 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the results of the analyses suggest, calls for service increased in the Palos 
Verdes neighborhood as a result of the team policing intervention.  However, these 
results do not necessarily indicate that crime and disorder incidents have also increased in 
the Palos Verdes neighborhood.  Because incidents were often not reported to the police 
in the past, the calls for service data, therefore, may not provide a representative count of 
the incidents that occurred prior to the intervention so a more definitive assessment of the 
crime rate is not currently possible.  Instead, given that calls for service can be described 
as a measure of the residents’ reporting behavior (Warner & Pierce, 1993), these 
increases may indicate that the residents have become more willing to report incidents to 
the police since the intervention began.  Further, the police lieutenant involved in the 
Palos Verdes project stated that the increase in calls for service is both a successful 
outcome of the intervention and an indication that “good police work” was being done in 
the neighborhood (R. DuVall, personal communication, March 15, 2013).     
Though the results of the analyses provide some insight into the impact of team 
policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the police lieutenant felt that the intervention 
has had a much broader impact than what the calls for service data can measure.  For 
example, he indicated that officers now feel welcome in the neighborhood and, in his 
opinion, the trash and graffiti cleanup events, the CMART inspections, and the Palos 
Verdes Pride event had the most effect on both bringing the residents together as a 
community and changing their attitudes toward the police (R. DuVall, personal 




In addition to evaluating the impact of team policing in the Palos Verdes 
neighborhood, this study also considered the possibility that the intervention could 
displace crime to nearby areas.  Though calls for service increased in the Palos Verdes 
neighborhood, the catchment area did not experience any significant changes in calls for 
service as a result of the team policing intervention.  While this suggests that a diffusion 
of crime control benefits did not occur during the intervention period, it also suggests that 
crime displacement did not occur either. 
   Among the other comparison areas, only Control Area 3 experienced significant 
changes in calls for service that could not be attributed to either seasonal fluctuations in 
numbers of calls for service or the presence of a police intervention.  However, according 
to an Area Command Information Officer in the Downtown Area Command, the calls for 
service decreases in Control Area 3 may have been the result of changes in management 
strategies at the properties where incidents of crime and disorder frequently occurred (G. 
Jackson, personal communication, March 22, 2013). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This study has several limitations that restrict the interpretations that can be made 
regarding the impact of team policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood.  First, as is the 
case with many police interventions, the team policing project was developed specifically 
to address the needs of the Palos Verdes neighborhood so random assignment was not 
possible.  As such, the control areas are non-equivalent to the Palos Verdes neighborhood 
and it is possible that the differences between these areas, other than the exposure to the 




Second, this study evaluated the immediate impact of team policing using calls 
for service data.  Previous studies have cautioned against this type of comparison because 
resident reporting bias has the greatest effect on calls for service data during the 
intervention period (Braga et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 2011; Weisburd & Green, 1995).  In 
other words, being aware of a police intervention may cause residents to be more 
sensitive to incidents of crime and disorder and more likely to report these incidents to 
the police.  As a consequence, the impact measured during the intervention period may be 
greater than the long-term impact of the intervention (Weisburd & Green, 1995).  
Therefore, future studies should evaluate the effects of an intervention over a longer 
period when using calls for service data in order to more adequately assess the impact of 
team policing. 
Third, because calls for service data are limited in their ability to measure rates of 
crime and disorder, future studies should also include in their analyses alternate data 
sources such as incident reports, arrest reports, and clearance rates.  Including data 
sources such as these would allow for more definitive conclusions about the effectiveness 
of team policing as a crime control strategy.  
Finally, as the comments from the police lieutenant suggest, evaluating team 
policing solely through quantitative data analyses provides only partial insight into its 
impact.  Future studies should incorporate more qualitative data analyses in the form of 
surveys and interviews in order to evaluate the impact of team policing on the perceptions 






Implications for the Future of Team Policing 
Team policing failed to become a policing standard during the 1970s because it 
was often considered a short-term special project rather than a lasting policing strategy.  
In order to succeed, team policing requires ongoing support from the rest of police 
department.  Unlike many previous team policing efforts, the Community Crimes Team 
had much support from the captain of the Convention Center Area Command and the 
lieutenant in charge of the Palos Verdes project.  However, due to the reorganization of 
the Convention Center Area Command in February 2013, the Palos Verdes neighborhood 
is no longer under its jurisdiction and several of the Community Crimes Team officers 
have received new assignments.  Because the team policing intervention has had a 
demonstrated impact on the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the Las Vegas Metropolitan 





LVMPD CALLS FOR SERVICE 
Calls for Service by Offense Category 




 407 Robbery 
 407G Robbery (gang-related) 
 407Z Robbery (attempted) 
 413 Person with a gun 
 413A Person with a knife 
 413B Person with other deadly weapon 
 413G Person with a gun (gang-related) 
 415 Assault and battery 
 415A Assault and battery with a gun 
 415B Assault and battery with other deadly weapon 
 415C Assault and battery (negative injury) 
 415D Assault and battery (domestic violence) 
 415G Assault and battery (gang-related) 
 415Z Assault and battery (attempted) 
 420 Homicide 
 420G Homicide (gang-related) 
 420Z Homicide (attempted) 
 426 Sexual assault 
 426Z Sexual assault (attempted) 
 434 Illegal shooting 
 434G Illegal shooting (gang-related) 
Property  
 
 406 Burglary 
 406V Auto burglary 
 406Z Burglary (attempted) 
 411 Stolen motor vehicle 
 411Z Stolen motor vehicle (attempted) 
Disorder  
 
 403 Prowler 
 408 Drunk 
 410 Reckless driver 
 416 Fight 
 416A Juvenile disturbance 
 416B Other disturbance 
 416F Fireworks call 






(table continued)   
Category Code Offense 
 416G Fight (gang-related) 
 416S Fight (school-related) 
 416V Fight (vice-related) 
 425 Suspicious situation 
 425A Suspicious person 
 425B Suspicious vehicle 
 425G Suspicious person (gang-related) 
 425H Anthrax threats 
 440 Wanted suspect 
 441 Malicious destruction of property 
 441G Malicious destruction of property (gang-related) 
 441V Malicious destruction of property (vice-related) 
 441Z Malicious destruction of property (attempted) 




GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF 
The first control area
Command and is shown in Figure 5
 




The second control area is located in the William 1














 is located in the Victor 5 sector/beat of the Northwest Area 
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The third control area is located in the Baker 4
Command and is shown in Figure 7
 



































     
 
Palos Verdes Neighborhood
 Catchment Area 
 Control Area 1 
 Control Area 2 

















LVMPD JURISDICTIONAL MAP 
 
  Control Area 2
    Control Area 3
 
 






































































































































































































































Figure 13. Total Calls for Service in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood, Previous Year: 
Intervention 
 

































































































































Figure 14. Total Calls for Service in the Catchment Area, Previous Year: Intervention 
 




















































































































































Figure 15. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 1, Previous Year: Intervention 
 
























































































































Figure 16. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 2, Previous Year: Intervention 
 















































































































Figure 17. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 3, Previous Year: Intervention 
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